Here we sit again but this time with the mid-to-high end properties staring into the abyss. They have not fallen anywhere near what the low-end has mostly because high-end borrowers were given more exotic, high-leverage loan programs such as Pay Option ARMs, 5/1 interest only loans, and 100% HELOCs to live off of. Arguably they have more reserves and better jobs, which have kept them paying for the depreciating asset much longer than with Subprime borrowers. The Alt-A and Jumbo Prime borrowers simply have loans that afforded them more time. But that has all changed and defaults across this space are surging. Foreclosures are coming, but not before the market begins its slide that ultimately will take the mid-to-high end market down 50% to 70% from its peak 2007 levels.
Here is Mr. Mortgage talking about the Alt-A crisis back in April of 2008. He notes that the universe of Alt-A is vastly bigger than subprime, with a multitude of exotic loan types. And negative equity abounds. As he says, "We know now that negative equity is the leading contributer of loan default." Highly recommended.
Karl Denninger points us to a WSJ article on the subject:
For the third straight month, option adjustable-rate mortgages are generating proportionally more delinquencies and foreclosures than subprime mortgages, the scourge of the housing crisis.
A further acceleration of troubles among the loans could mean higher-than-expected losses for Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC) and JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), as well as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.'s own insurance fund.
"The realization of the issues related to option ARMs is just beginning," says Chris Marinac, director of research at Atlanta-based FIG Partners.
Denninger comments:
Wells "acquired" $115 billion of these things when they "bought" Wachovia. They claim they're worth $93 billion. Oh really? A bunch of loans that were mostly at or near 100% Loan-to-value (that is, near zero equity) when originally written, in markets where prices have declined by half? Oh, and in May, the firm said that 51% of the balances out were being paid only on the minimum - that is, they are still negatively-amortizing even as house prices fall! Talk about double-screwed!
JP Morgan, for its part, has nearly $90 billion in exposure through both its "acquisition" of WaMu and a pretty set of off-balance sheet "vehicles" (which of course are being shielded from having to be accounted for, and who knows how well those are performing!)
Here's a quick look at the WFC chart, which shows signs of topping with price trading just below the 50 and 200 day moving averages.

Which brings us to the story of Lenny Dykstra's house. Dykstra, the former Mets and Phillies outfielder turned investment guru, has been hailed as a "stockpicking genius" by the likes of Jim Cramer. Except now he's bankrupt.
Mr. Mortgage's SoCal counterpart Dr. Housingbubble tells us the story of Dykstra's mortgage default as an illustration of what is happening in Westside Los Angeles. Dykstra bought his Thousand Oaks house from Wayne Gretzky in 2007, and reportedly has "between $10 and $50 million in debt" against $50 thousand in assets. I'll let the doctor take it from here:
According to the bankruptcy petition, Dykstra’s largest unsecured creditors include units of JPMorgan Chase & Co., owed $12.9 million, and Bank of America Corp, owed a combined $4.2 million.
Hackett said Washington Mutual, now part of JPMorgan, was the main lender on the 2007 home purchase, and that the bank misled Dykstra about his ability to afford the property. The lawyer said the bank deserves nothing on its claim.
JPMorgan spokesman Tom Kelly said: “We don’t comment on individual cases, but we expect our customers to repay their legal obligations under their mortgages when possible.”
Bwahaha! $12.9 million plus $4.2 million comes out to $17.1 million! You mean to say on a $17.5 million dollar place Washington Mutual and Bank of American allowed virtually a zero down play? I was searching for the home in the MLS but it doesn’t seem to be there given the bankruptcy filing which will now forcibly sort things out. In April it was reported by Zillow that Sotheby’s International had the home listed at $25 million which obviously did not sell. The current Zestimate is $13.1 million. Apparently, multi-million dollar properties are not immune to the busting housing market.
The post goes on to discuss other aspects of the SoCal housing bubble, including a Culver City home currently in default:
This is a nice 5-bedroom home with 3 bathrooms. It is definitely a good home for a higher income professional. Yet even these kind of homes are not immune to the housing bubble bursting. The home has been on the MLS for 67 days. It is currently a short sale but at this range, you don’t have a big client base like you would with some Real Homes of Genius. It is a larger home with 3,017 square feet and is listed as being built in 2005. This home has a last sale in 1992 for $206,000. But once again like the Culver City home example, it looks like this home was the ultimate California equity withdrawal machine.
This home was tapped out like a keg. Keep in mind the last sale occurred in 1992 for only $206,000 and somehow managed to end up with a $1,030,000 first mortgage on the place. Looking on the history you will see how notorious Wells Fargo was in this California housing bubble but also First Federal Bank, an option ARM specialist. The notice of default was filed on July of 2009 so this is a fairly new listing but given the enormous amount of notice of defaults being filed, we are going to have an epic Alt-A and option ARM wave hitting like a ton of bricks later in 2009 and into 2010. The public-private investment program better stay away from these California loans because you can rest assured these are the kind of loans that will be pushed into it.
As you can see, the current borrower is now behind by $19,395 and this of course will be growing each day the home doesn’t sell. And it isn’t selling.
Keep in mind that California is a huge component of the US economy. With the country's biggest economic engine writing IOU's and experiencing a still-growing mortgage crisis, talk of economic recovery seems premature.



















































































